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From a writer with long and high-level experience in the U.S. government, a startling and provocative assessment of America’s global dominance. Maximalist puts the history of our foreign policy in an unexpected new light, while drawing fresh, compelling lessons for the present and future.
When the United States has succeeded in the world, Stephen Sestanovich argues, it has done so not by staying the course but by having to change it—usually amid deep controversy and uncertainty. For decades, the United States has been a power like no other. Yet presidents and policy makers worry that they—and, even more, their predecessors—haven’t gotten things right. Other nations, they say to themselves, contribute little to meeting common challenges. International institutions work badly. An effective foreign policy costs too much. Public support is shaky. Even the greatest successes often didn’t feel that way at the time.
Sestanovich explores the dramatic results of American global primacy built on these anxious foundations, recounting cycles of overcommitment and underperformance, highs of achievement and confidence followed by lows of doubt. We may think there was a time when America’s international role reflected bipartisan unity, policy continuity, and a unique ability to work with others, but Maximalist tells a different story—one of divided administrations and divisive decision making, of clashes with friends and allies, of regular attempts to set a new direction. Doing too much has always been followed by doing too little, and vice versa.
Maximalist unearths the backroom stories and personalities that bring American foreign policy to life. Who knew how hard Lyndon Johnson fought to stay out of the war in Vietnam—or how often Henry Kissinger ridiculed the idea of visiting China? Who remembers that George Bush Sr. found Ronald Reagan’s diplomacy too passive—or that Bush Jr. considered Bill Clinton’s too active? Leaders and scoundrels alike emerge from this retelling in sharper focus than ever before. Sestanovich finds lessons in the past that anticipate and clarify our chaotic present.
- Sales Rank: #238989 in Books
- Brand: Sestanovich, Stephen
- Published on: 2014-10-14
- Released on: 2014-10-14
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 7.98" h x .80" w x 5.18" l, .81 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 416 pages
From Booklist
The recent revelations concerning spying on leaders of our allies by the NSA may have surprised many. However, in this survey of American foreign policy over the past seven decades, Sestanovich, a former diplomat and currently a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University, makes clear that all administrations have used ethically questionable tactics in the pursuit of broader strategic foreign-policy goals. But Sestanovich is more concerned with consistency than ethics in the conduct of our foreign policy. He asserts that between and even within administrations we have lurched from active (or overactive) involvement to retrenchment. After WWII, we understandably shrank our military and shrank from confrontation until forced into involvement by the Korean War. Similarly, the failures in Vietnam and Iraq have caused similar reluctance to intervene abroad. The result, Sestanovich maintains, is a dangerous uncertainty among both our allies and adversaries. What he views as retrenchment could be considered sensible restraint. Still, this is a valuable and provocative interpretation of our diplomatic and military conduct. --Jay Freeman
Review
“[An] analytic tour de force . . . a useful and often original look at the strategies of the last 12 American presidents . . . a strong case. . . . Anyone interested in the past or the future of American foriegn policy and power would benefit from its insights.” —Walter Russell Mead, Foreign Affairs
“In his engaging and richly anecdotal new book, Maximalist, Stephen Sestanovich applies that understanding as a framework for reexamining post-World War II U.S. history to find the persistent truths and lessons that he believes can inform our understanding of the present. . . . A scholar of the Soviet Union and a former U.S. diplomat who now teaches at Columbia University, Sestanovich shows that the ambitions of policymakers and the cycles of public opinion that drive them are inevitable and recurrent. He is at his best in describing the Johnson and Nixon administrations, capturing the infighting among those presidents and their senior advisers as they grappled with America’s role in the world.” —Marcus Brauchli, The Washington Post
“Maximalist . . . makes clear that the U.S. has never achieved strategic continuity. American strategy has frequently shifted, sometimes over the course of a single administration, and these disruptions have often proved beneficial to our national security. . . . [An] excellent book.” —Sohrab Ahmari, The Wall Street Journal
“Among the many virtues of Maximalist is the mathematical elegance of its thesis. . . .Maximalist surveys American foreign policy from Truman to Obama. . . . Compelling. . . . Refreshingly non-partisan.” —Michael Doran, Commentary
“Maximalist is a highly readable account of American engagement during the Cold War and the War on Terror. It provides a commonsense means to assess American military and diplomatic policy without the fog of political rhetoric.” —Karl Wolff, New York Journal of Books
“A leading voice. . . . Offers a provocative reasssement of America's global dominance. . . . Sestanovich finds fresh lessons in the past that clarify our chaotic present."
—The Record
“Incisive and provocative. Written by one of our country’s foremost scholars, Maximalist is rich with anecdotes and enlivened by little-known details about well-known events. Sestanovich has made a masterful contribution to the history of modern American diplomacy.” —Madeleine Albright
“This is one of the most important books ever written about U.S. foreign policy. It will immediately join George F. Kennan’s classic American Diplomacy as essential reading for all students of America’s behavior in the world. In fact, it should replace it. Sestanovich is a brilliant and insightful writer. His book couldn’t be more timely.” —Robert Kagan, author of The World America Made
“Maximalist is a nicely provocative and highly readable account of how presidents have used American power since World War II. It combines carefully researched history with advice that is very relevant to the situation of the United States today.” —Joseph S. Nye, Jr., author of Soft Power and Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era
“Americans routinely need to be reminded that our past was not as smooth and rosy as we like to remember it; Stephen Sestanovich provides a masterful and entertaining corrective. Maximalist is beautifully written, with engaging anecdotes woven throughout. Most important, it will change your view of Obama's foreign policy.” —Anne-Marie Slaughter, President and CEO, New America Foundation; Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
About the Author
Stephen Sestanovich served as U.S. ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union during the Clinton administration, as a senior staff member at the National Security Council and the State Department during the Reagan administration, and as senior legislative assistant to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He is currently the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Diplomacy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and the George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Most helpful customer reviews
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful.
Absolutely Wonderful!!!
By Drew F. Schufletowski
I learned some things about the tumultuous post-World War II policy-making environment in Washington of which I was not aware despite considerable previous reading on the subject. Every current student of international relations and the U.S. role in the world really ought to read Sestanovich's new book.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
The Cyclic Nature of Foreign Policy?
By GraniteSapper
Much of the recent spate of writing decrying the decline of U.S. power and influence centers on issues of domestic decay and turmoil, with the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world. Some authors argue that these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan Sestanovich, the author of the recently-published Maximalist, shows that the current challenges of the Obama administration are not new, but part of cycle that can be traced back to the post-World War II Truman administration.
Sestanovich is a former U.S. diplomat, and an official under both Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of international relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and very thorough history of U.S. foreign policy since 1947. The book does not introduce much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author is successful in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many anecdotes to retell the story in a slightly new way. It is a worthy addition to U.S. foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or craft future foreign policy.
The book expands on a thesis, that of a “maximalist” tradition in U.S. foreign policy, one Sestanovich first examined in a Spring 2005 article from The National Interest. Sestanovich, in this new book, describes a foreign policy and diplomatic continuum cycling between periods of maximalism to retrenchment. One critique of the book is that the author never defines these two terms, so central to his argument. The reader quickly intuits that maximalism equals overreach, with retrenchment the “do less” corollary that follows when America must pick up the pieces. The author then details how administrations cycle between these two extremes: the maximalist Truman followed by a retrencher Eisenhower; who is then followed by maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton; the maximalism of George W. Bush; and finally this current period retrenchment of President Obama.
A few unanswered questions simmer below the surface as the reader follows a story long on narrative but short on analysis. The central question and criticism is that the cycle as described is far too simplistic. Can any administration be categorized as purely maximalist or retrencher? The author concedes that most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were almost always influenced by external events, beyond the ken of the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to cleanly categorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations for these very reasons, and the author notes that it was not President George W. Bush’s initial intent to be a maximalist. The second- and third-order impacts of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The decisions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black swans like 9-11 are as if not more responsible for shifts in focus. Campaign rhetoric and an administration’s ‘going-in position’ rarely survive first contact with future realities. The author would have been better served to incorporate more of this dynamic in his cyclic analysis, and examine why presidents seem to so often misjudge or fail to anticipate events that shake their preferred interrelationship with the world.
Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administrations to ‘go large’ or ‘go small’ when pursuing national interests and exporting American values and exceptionalism. The interplay between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger is one of the highlights of the book, particularly in their efforts in opening relations with China. This examination is interesting but it is also incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars and analysts, fails to adequately account for the domestic political dynamics and issues that impact the nation’s ability to act globally. It is as though the author believes that international credibility trumps domestic will. This Innenpolitik – Realpolitik interplay and tension, best explained in Peter Trubowitz’s book Politics and Strategy, is ground zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events abroad can derail or re-vector foreign policy, so too will domestic challenges, often causing an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovich’s argument would have been strengthened in recognizing this relationship and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative.
The author’s lack of detailed analysis does detract from his argument that the United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and to be more maximalist than retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken by the Obama administration, can be as effective, or at least a suitable course for the times. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains an excellent history of U.S. foreign policy since 1947, and provides yet another lens through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era. Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take note.
10 of 14 people found the following review helpful.
Good foreign policy history from Truman to Obama
By Gderf
This is an excellent history of maximalist presidents who needed or desired to use American power to fix the world alternating with those who needed to follow a minimalist or retrenchment course. Sestanovich relates the poor results of multilateralism and how American success has not depended on international institutions like the UN and NATO.
Truman's legacy is the loss of China and the Korean war and the expansive Truman doctrine in Turkey and Greece. On the positive side, he instituted the Marshall plan that preserved western Europe from communism. Truman after implementing the Marshall Plan, fought the Korean War and promulgated the Truman Doctrine regarding policy towards Turkey and Greece.
Eisenhower cut back military expenditures, backed dictators and started the nuclear arms race. George Kennan originated the cold war policy of containment. Hungarians expected more help. Our allies were surprised at betrayal in the Suez crisis.
Kennedy combined an activist bent with extensive deliberation. He was forced into activist roles in the Berlin air lift and Cuban missile crisis. He expanded the Cold War into a nuclear arms race while beginning the policy of limited test ban treaties.. The book embellishes the near danger of nuclear war triggered by Cuba and the Russian submarine incident.
We still suffer from the aftermath of the well documented LBJ era of war and Great Society. Johnson is depicted as a compulsively hands on president, exhibiting totally uncertain policy, being drawn into the Vietnam War by inches by his advisors McNamara and Westmorland. Stepanovich calls him the only president who attempted to carry out the policy of his predecessor. A very arguable point of view.
Nixon never understood VN culture. His legacy is Kent State, My Lie, overthrow of elected governments and support of repressive regimes like Pinochet and Suharto. Nixon and Kissinger opened relations with China and actively sought peace in the ME. One key aspect was Sadat leaving the Soviet fold. Ford carried on for Nixon.
Jimmy Carter's legacy is abrogation of the presidency to Congress which failed to deal with domestic inflation or foreign problems. The book depicts Carter's inept handling of everything from Soviet relations to the hostage crisis.
Reagan is accused of a passive management style. He generally rebuffed the peace initiatives of Gorbachev, who knew that Star Wars could not protect the USA. Gorbachev lost his battle with NATO over nuclear balance.
GWH Bush went from an active role in Iraq to attempted retrenchment and fiscal responsibility.
The 1990s presaged a return to activism. Clinton switched from retrenchment in his first term to activism in Bosnia in his second. He watched helplessly as events unfolded in Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti. Holbrooke formulated activist policy for late intervention in Bosnia. Clinton, as president, ended ADFC and instituted energy and financial deregulation. The book overlooks the easy money policy that set the stage for the bubbles in 2000 and 2008. The Reagan foreign policy peace dividend was mostly squandered with an easy money domestic policy that set the stage for two economic bubbles.
The recent painful legacy of George Bush is well depicted. GW Bush foreign policy course after 9/11 still haunts us today, with residues of two wars. Republicans and Dems (Pelosi) thought that Saddam had WMDs. General Franks thought that we would be gone from Iraq within a year.
The Obama administration follows Bush policies, appointing a hawkish Secretary of State, and promoting continuation of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as developing drone capability and condoning resultant civilian deaths. The civil rights abuses at Guantanamo continue unabated. He tells the American people we are winding down while telling Afghans, led by his friend Hamid Karzai, that we will never leave. Obama continuously accedes to the view of his military advisors. He accelerated the war with a Bush like surge. While Obama claims the exit from Iraq as fulfilling a promise, it was negotiated by Bush. The war on drugs is as ineffectual as ever as he follows Bush domestic policy for a slow recovery.
Obama follows Bush policy in spite of retrenchment rhetoric. Obama, despite talking about need for retrenchment following the excesses of the Bush administration, follows the Bush exit schedule from Iraq and copied the Bush surge in Afghanistan with subsequent troop increases. Obama then tried for his own war legacy in Iraq. Obama's "pivot to the Pacific" appears to be China appeasement coupled with desertion of ME allies, Israel and Egypt. Sepanovich points out that we were lucky to obtain the benefit of Russian diplomacy to avoid humiliation in Syria. The book was too early to note the current impasse in the Crimea characterized by Obama's futile empty rhetoric. We can only hope there is no Obama war legacy in the offing.
Sestanovich ends with summary of maximalists Truman, JFK, LBJ, Reagan and GW Bush ;minimalists Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Obama; and two he calls hybrid who switched from one to the other, GWH Bush and Clinton.
It's difficult to ignore the effect of domestic policy on foreign policy especially in the areas of finance and trade. The decline of America, while due to primarily to social policy, can't be ignored in military and foreign policy, as Sestanovich attempts to do. The epilogue analysis shows how less is often more. I wish our current leaders would believe it.
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